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There are numerous existing political atheologies that can be characterised by three 
movements ± negative, positive, and critical atheological projects. By focusing on the critical 
atheologies of two political theorists, Richard Rorty and William Connolly, this article 
SUHVHQWV DQ LQVLGHU¶V YLHZ RI WKH LQIOXHQFH WKDW DWKHLVP KDV RQ SROLWLFDO WKRXJKW $IWHU
GUDZLQJRXWMXVWZKDWPDNHV5RUW\DQG&RQQROO\¶VSKLORVRSKLHVatheological, this article sets 
itself the task of drawing the consequences of a critical atheology for two fundamental 
concepts of contemporary political theory: secularism and toleration. These Enlightenment 
ideals can be rescued and re-framed following a pluralist critique. By refining our 
understanding of secularism beyond a strict church-state separation, an agonistic secularism 
which promotes an ethos of engagement is defended therein. Secondly, toleration is then 
defended in its agonistic form to include the practice of critique against conceptions of 
indifference or respect. Finally, the hard case of the French ban on veils in public schools is 

















Atheism, secularism and toleration Ȃ towards a political atheology 
 
Contemporary political theorists have analysed the impact of religious belief on the 
conceptualisations of toleration and secularism, highlighting the nuances that particular 
interpretations of Christian (Schwartzman, 2005, De Roover and Balagangadhara, 2008), 
Muslim (March 2010), Jewish (Fraenkel, 2010), Hindu (Spinner-Halev, 2005, De Roover et 
al., 2011) and other religious beliefs have contributed to our thinking of these concepts 
(McLennan, 2010). Yet there are no systematic studies of the role that atheism plays in 
contemporary political theory. This article seeks to remedy this bias, and proposes to build on 
a three-fold understanding of atheology that I have already defended elsewhere (Devellennes 
2014)%\XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH WHUPµDWKHRORJ\¶ DVD WKUHH-fold movement characterised by a 
negative phase (a-theology), a positive phase (atheo-logy), and a critical phrase 
(metatheology), I propose to draw out the consequences of the last of these phases for 
political theory today. In the first section of this article, after a brief analysis of the negative 
and positive phases of atheology, I turn to the critical phase that has the most potential to 
contribute in original ways to important debates on secularism and toleration. It is essential, 
for this task, to take seriously the work of atheists themselves, and not impose an 
understanding of atheism from the outside. The focus on two major political theorists that 
have vocally defended their atheism (or non-WKHLVPLQ&RQQROO\¶VFDVHKHOSVEULQJFODULW\
to the debate and draw out nuances that were lacking from the negative and positive phases of 
atheology. ,QSDUWLFXODUE\GUDZLQJRXW5RUW\¶VDQG&RQQROO\¶Vconceptualisation of atheism 
(and nontheism) vis-à-vis religion, it will become clear that we need to consider atheism 
(alongside religious belief) as an essential influence behind political thought. Atheism will 
also be studied as an existential belief, in many ways on par with other (religious) existential 
beliefs. In the second part of this article, I propose to discuss secularism from an atheological 
standpoint, in order to propose that a political atheology can defend a concept of agonistic 
secularism, which answers separate issuHV IRXQG LQ 5RUW\¶V GHIHQFH RI DQG &RQQROO\¶V
critique of secularism. I will show that secularism demands too much when it insists upon the 
exclusion of private beliefs from the public sphere, and too little when it perceives the 
separation of church and state as the model of government. In the third part of this article, I 
propose a theory of toleration that attempts to move past a liberal understanding of toleration 
so often criticised in contemporary political thought, and to hang on to critique which 
CRQQROO\¶V HPSKDVLV RQ UHVSHFW VHHPV WR SUHFOXGH Finally, this article will illustrate how 
such a political atheology ± with its agonistic secularism and toleration ± can revisit a test-
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case for contemporary political thought: that of the ban on the Muslim veil in France. Against 
the defence of the veil as a matter of protection of young women, this article will demonstrate 
that the atheology proposed here provides a new critical argument against the ban. In 
particular, it will show that atheists, as a minority, have crossover interests with other 
religious groups, in this case Muslims. I will then argue that the French ban on veils 
discriminates positively against atheists ± but perhaps not for long ± and raises issues of 
fairness that atheists cannot ignore. Lastly, I will argue that atheists should be particularly 
weary of restrictions on freedom of expression, as their central concept of critical scepticism 
depends on it.  
I A three-fold political atheology 
One can identify three distinct phases of atheism, both historical and contemporary. They can 
be conceptualised as negative (a-theism), with an emphasis on a critique of theism and of the 
social consequences of religion; as positive (athe-ism), as attempts to build a positive 
philosophy that does not use God or the divine as a basis; and as critical (meta-theism), as an 
attempt to move past the dialectic for theism-atheism towards a philosophy that has gone past 
both God and its negation (Devellennes, 2014). The first two phases of atheism are discussed 
here, and the third part will be given more attention in subsequent parts as Rorty and 
&RQQROO\¶VWKRXJKWVODUJHO\ILWZLWKLQWKLVFULWLFDOSKDVH 
The new atheists ± Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens ± 
have spearheaded a movement aiming at the desanctification of God, religion, and faith in the 
twenty-first century. Although characterised as µnew¶, their atheism is often a repetition of 
much older arguments, such as those found in the posthumous memoirs of Jean Meslier, an 
eighteenth century Catholic priest who denounced his faith and avowed his atheism ± for the 
first time in Western history (Moëne, 2003, Israel, 2006: 767). What is the significance, for 
political theory, of this particular kind of polemical atheism? I suggest here that the new 
atheists have a powerful negative role, and that these self-appointed defenders of disbelief re-
contextualise atheistic critiques of the Enlightenment. Their negative critiques also have 
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severe limitations, however (Wilde, 2010). Their emphasis on anti-religious arguments, 
antagonistic positions against all faiths, reliance on scientific rationalism, and defence of 
strict secularism remain weak and unconvincing ± even from within atheology. 
 Contemporary atheists continue this critique of kleptocracy that originated in 
eighteenth-century atheism, attacking the alliance between the prince and the priest, still 
relevant today (Dennett, 2007: 171-2). The fighting of wars in the name of religion (Dawkins, 
2006: 278), including by George W. Bush when he was president of the United States 
(Harris, 2004: 47), is at the very least problematised by an atheology worthy of its name. The 
virtual impossibility of a honest atheist to hold office in the United States (Dawkins, 2006: 
45), the labelling of entire people, and especially of children, as members of a religious 
community (Dawkins, 2006: 278), the existence of religious fanaticism (Dennett, 2007: 299), 
the punishment of apostasy (Harris, 2004: 115), blasphemy laws on the statute book in the 
UK until 2008 (Dawkins, 2006: 289), the issue of euthanasia (Dawkins, 2006: 356), the link 
between the death penalty, and criminal justice in general and belief in free will (Harris, 
2004: 157), policies on stem cell research (Harris, 2004: 167), the pursuing of abstinence-
only sexual education (Harris 2004: 168); the list could go on and on... There are still, on 
many levels, political decisions and debates that take place on a religious basis. 
The task of an atheology is to move beyond this (nonetheless necessary) negative 
phase in order to construct a positive formulation of the political. It is not self-evident, 
however, that atheists can agree on a positive doctrine (Ysseldyk et al, 2012). The example of 
-HDQ 0HVOLHU DQG WKH EDURQ G¶+ROEDFK WZR HLJKWHenth-century thinkers, testifies to this 
difficulty. Meslier (2009), the communalist thinker who thinks at the level of the parish, is in 
many ways opposed to Holbach (2004), the republican thinker that thinks about Europe ± if 
not the world ± as a whole. Beyond the reaction by both authors to the political abuses of 
religion in their times, it is not obvious that their atheism necessarily contributes to a united 
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political doctrine. It is thus better to speak of different political atheologies than a unified 
atheology, though there are potential areas of agreement between these atheist thinkers. 
 Firstly, the critique of uselessness in both Meslier and Holbach leads to a valuation of 
utility as a political value. More developed in the thought of Holbach, this utilitarian politics 
aims at providing a positive guidance based on principles that are not grounded in religion or 
guaranteed by God. An atheology is not necessarily a political philosophy for atheists. 
Because atheists discuss the relations between humans qua humans, and not with respect to 
their orthodoxy to particular belief-systems, they always maintain a potentially universal (or 
at least cross-religious) aspect. This is certainly true of Holbach's utilitarian µEthocracy¶, 
ZKHUHXWLOLW\¶Vuniversal appeal nevertheless remains a malleable concept and the interest of 
³JUHDWHVWQXPEHU´LVQHYHUVHOI-evident LQWKHEDURQ¶VWKRXJKW. Once the meaning of interest 
is problematised, utility acts as an immanent concern that all societies share, although each 
remains the judge of its interpretation. In other words, utility is not necessarily a principle of 
uniformity, as it also demands that different circumstances be treated differently ± HolbacK¶V
ethocratic republic is also a pragmatist and pluralist republic. Utility can act as a critical tool, 
it points to the question of interest in the political realm. Asking the question µCui bono?¶ is 
central to political thought, and a utilitarian politics attempts to ensure that it is answered with 
µthe greatest number¶. 5RUW\¶VSUDJPDWLVPLQPDQ\ZD\VFRQWLQXHVWKLVWUDGLWLRQRIDWKHLVWLF
concern for human well-being. This utilitarian, or even pragmatist principle is certainly 
never above critique, as +DQQDK$UHQGW¶VTXHVWLRQ: µAnd what is the use of use?¶
remains a potentially fatal challenge to it. When utility is coupled with a pragmatic outlook, it 
can however provide a framework for political institutions. 
 There is thus a potential for a positive dimension to political atheologies. Richard 
Dawkins, more famous for his negative and aggressive atheism, has also attempted to make a 
positive contribution through the creation of his µNon-Believers Giving Aid¶. Alain de 
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%RWWRQ¶V FDOO IRU WKH FUHDWLRQ RI DQ DWKHLVW WHPSOH LQ /RQGRQ WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D 1DWLRQDO
Atheist Party and the First Church of Atheism in the United States, are all part of this drive 
by atheists to encroach on religious monopoly of certain social and political spheres. They are 
certainly limited in several respects: they mimic religious institutions, are largely limited to a 
voluntarist model of private associations, often claim to represent all atheists despite diversity 
in atheistic beliefs, and remain largely reactionary towards religion. They also assume a 
model of rational agency that has faced multiple lines of attack ± from more theologically-
inclined philosophers such as MacIntyre and 5LF°XU (1969), and Taylor (2007) ± but also 
from atheological thinkers.  
 
Two of the most influential political theorists of the past decades have been vocal ± if at 
times ambiguous ± defenders of a critical version of atheism. Richard Rorty, a self-avowed 
atheist, and William Connolly, who prefers the label of nontheist, have made valuable 
contributions that largely supersede the contributions of µnew atheists¶ to political theory. As 
Charles Guignon and David Hiley (2003: 30) KDYH ULJKWO\ QRWHG 5RUW\¶V SURMHFW can be 
accurately described as an attempt to draw the consequences of an atheist position. This is 
UHIOHFWHG LQ5RUW\¶V UHSHDWHG LGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKDQDWKHLVWLFSRVLWLRQ5RUW\FOHDUO\IHOW WKDW
his thought was influenced by his atheism, and his thought can be appropriately described as 
an atheoORJ\$V ,ZLOO VKRZ5RUW\¶VSRVLWLRQs on secularism and toleration, in particular, 
have been widely informed by the kind of rationalist Enlightenment he wishes to build on and 
overcome)LUVWOHWPHWXUQWRWKHOLQNWKDWFDQEHVHHQEHWZHHQ5RUW\¶VSUDJmatist position 
and his atheism.  
 ,Q 5RUW\¶V HDUO\ ZRUNV QRWDEO\ WKH HVVD\V SXEOLVKHG in The Consequences of 
Pragmatism (1982), the pragmatist does not look very much like an atheist. The figure of the 
secularist that he defends then is indeed sceptical about the existence of God, but does not 
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deny it (1982: xiv). The pragmatist here perceives questions about Truth, Goodness, Nature, 
Will, and God as empty metaphysical statements. They are at best useful as metaphors and 
rhetoric, at worst dangerous when taken seriously (1982: xvii). This is why Wallach (1987) 
could GHVFULEH 5RUW\¶V WKRXJKW DV FORVHU WR DJQRVWLFLVP WKDQ DWKHLVP 7KH SUDJPDWLVW DV
such, is not necessarily an atheist ± she does not need to deny the existence of God, or 
express a belief in the nonexistence of God ± but needs to be, at the very least, a sceptic. 
What Rorty (1982: 24) draws our attention to is that the secularisation of certain religious 
concepts, such as the will of God, into non-religious formulations ± the moral law ± is not 
straightforward for any sceptic, whether she is an atheist or not. )XUWKHUPRUH 5RUW\¶s 
criticism of the notion of human nature, still permeating liberal thought, as emanating from a 
Christian conception of the Brotherhood of Man, suggests that one needs to be sceptical of 
Christian claims per se; since they might enforce our prejudices into an established 
metaphysical web of power (1982: 207).  
 7KHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI5RUW\¶VSROLWLFDOWKHRU\DUHH[SDQGHGXSRQLQKLVODWHUZRUNV,Q
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty builds on his radical scepticism towards divine 
truth, whether in theological or secularisHG IRUP 5RUW\¶V scepticism is extended to the 
ontological unity still found in the approaches to the natural world, and to conceptions of 
individuality that take the self for a final and united entity outside of social relations. With 
respect to the divinisation of the natural world, Rorty is certainly going further than 
eighteenth-century atheists, notably Meslier and Holbach, for whom matter still had a fixed 
ontology, while Rorty is surely FORVHUWR+XPH¶VUDGLFDOscepticism5RUW\¶VGH-divinisation 
of the individual has important consequences for political thought, and earned him, from 
some commentators, the label of being a µcommunitarian¶ :DOODch, 1987: 581). What his 
thought does point to is that our conceptions of our selves are never acquired ex nihilo, but 
come from a particular engagement with a tradition, and in certain cases a reaction to it. 
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Rorty is not a conservative µcommunitarian,¶ as his ideal of self-creation, with its Nietzschean 
URRWV LPSOLHV RQH¶V DELOLW\ WR IUHH RQHVHOI IURP FXOWXUDO SUHMXGLFHV +LV LQWHU-subjective 
conception of agency, in other words, is one that must be embedded in an agonistic social 
setting, where particular Weltanschauungen struggle against one another for social approval.  
These two movements of de-divinisation, in other words, have consequences for 
5RUW\¶V DWKHRORJ\ ,Q WKH ILUVW SODFH 5RUW\¶V FRQWLQJHQW FRQFHSWLRQ RI QDWXUH SURSRVHV D
powerful alternative to think about political theory. If nature is contingent, as Rorty proposes, 
there are important consequences that emanate from this claim. One needs to go further than 
5RUW\WRGUDZWKHPRXWKRZHYHU4XHQWLQ0HLOODVVRX[¶VVSHFXODWLYHUHDOLVPLVKHUH a vital 
work that draws the consequences of contingency for philosophy. The realism side of 
0HLOODVVRX[¶VWKRXJKWKLJKOLJKWVWKHUHDOLW\RIDZRUOGµout there¶ while the speculative side 
insists on our inability to grasp it fully through human reason, and on the necessarily 
VSHFXODWLYHQDWXUHRIRXUDWWHPSWVWRNQRZWKHZRUOG5RUW\¶VFRQWLQJHQWVRFLDOKRSHFDQEH
described in similar terms. There are material conditions that need to be improved for human 
beings, but every attempt to describe these ± and the way they should be improved ± is bound 
to be speculative. For Meillassoux, the necessity of contingency has radical atheological 
conclusions. µ[T]his something, that Chaos will never produce, is a necessary being. 
Everything can be produced, everything can happen ± H[FHSW VRPHWKLQJ QHFHVVDU\¶ 
89). In other words, God, whether it is the theistic, deistic, or even pantheistic God, is no 
longer possible under the conditions of the necessity of contingency. Rorty had not gone this 
far, but contingency after Meillassoux makes most Western conceptions of deities 
impossible.i  
In the second place, 5RUW\¶V inter-subjective conception of agency means that an 
DWKHLVW¶V YRFDEXODU\ LV WDNen not as a final movement in the history of ideas, not as the 
ultimate emancipation from theological thought, but as situated in a struggle against other 
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belief-systems that seek to impose counter-claims on the political. Within the framework of a 
liberal democracy, this means recognisLQJRWKHUV¶FODLPVWRVLPLODUO\FRQWLQJHQWYRFDEXODULHV
and the legitimacy of their views. This is the reason why toleration is so proPLQHQWLQ5RUW\¶V
political thought (Bernstein, 1987: 542). Furthermore, this type of atheology makes the claim 
that attempts to unify ± under one national, religious or ethnic banner ± the realm of the 
political are likely to lead to intolerance. Liberalism seeks a modus vivendi of sorts, but it 
cannot seek one conception of the good, nor can it hope to find a conception of justice 
DJUHHDEOH RQ WKH VDPH WHUPV E\ DOO FLWL]HQV 7KLV LV WKH EDVLV IRU 5RUW\¶V defence of the 
Jeffersonian compromise, a strict separation of religion and politics, which seeks to privatise 
religion and keep it away from the public square.  
:HDWKHLVWV GRLQJRXUEHVW WR HQIRUFH -HIIHUVRQ¶V FRPSURPLVH WKLQN LW EDGHQRXJK
that we cannot run for public office without being disingenuous about our disbelief in 
God; despite the compromise, no uncloseted atheist is likely to get elected anywhere 
in the country. (Rorty, 1999: 169)  
 
The Jeffersonian compromise, in other words, is already detrimental to publicly spirited 
atheists in the United States. A challenge to that compromise is likely to lead to an even worst 
situation for them, and strict secularism is defended as a minimum condition for a political 
atheology. 5RUW\¶V VHFXODULVP DOVR FRQWLQXHV ZLWK WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW VFHSWLFLVP DERXW WKH
usefulness of priests. In one of his final works, Rorty shows some regrets for having 
GHVFULEHGKLPVHOIDVDQµDWKHLVW¶5RUW\DQG9DWWLPR, 33). He seems to have changed 
KLVPLQGEXWRQO\LQ WHUPVRIUKHWRULFDOIRUFH)RUWKHODEHOKHSUHIHUVµDQWLFOHULFDOLVP¶ LV
selected precisely because of its political dimension. Against those atheists who see their 
atheism as an empirical hypothesis, Rorty prefers atheists that see their atheism as a political 
view, and are tolerant of privatised religion. His ideal atheist, in other words, is a political 
atheist who defends the Jeffersonian compromise. 
5RUW\¶VVWULFWVHFXODULVPKRZHYHULVZHDNRQVeveral accounts. For instance, he has 
been widely criticised for refusing to provide grounds or foundations for his liberalism ± thus 
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weakening his political doctrine by a spurious appeal to a public/private distinction. This 
distinction, Wallach has argued (1987: 599), excludes deep moral and political discourses, 
which his inter-subjective conception of agency would seem to require. Connolly also 
SURYLGHVDSRWHQWFKDOOHQJHWR5RUW\¶VVWURQJVHFXODULVPDV,ZLOOVKRZ$VWULFWVHSDUDWLRQRI
religion and the public sphere is by no means a guarantee that religious belief does not 
permeate public decisions. 
 
:LOOLDP&RQQROO\¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVDWKHLVPLVPXFKPRUHDPELJXRXVWKDQ5RUW\¶VDQGKLV
WKRXJKWLVQRWDVVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\SXWZLWKLQDQ³DWKHRORJ\´Ds I do here. There is room, as I 
will show, to characterise his thought as atheological ± he does so himself at times ± and his 
ambiguity towards dogmatic atheism is a powerful reminder of the limitations that atheism as 
political doctrine faces.  
 Why is Connolly so ambiguous towards atheists? One needs to go into the footnotes 
to find out why.  
$ ODVW ³WKHRORJLFDO´ SRLQW $OWKRXJK WKHUH DUH SRZHUIXO SUHVVXUHV ELQGLQJ WKH
FRPPDQGDQGGHVLJQWUDGLWLRQV WRWKHDXWKRULW\RIDJRGD³SRVW-1LHW]VFKHDQ´HWKLF
nHHGQRWUHVLVWHYHU\FRQFHSWLRQRIGLYLQLW\$JRGDV³DEVHQFH´IRULQVWDQFHPLJKW
be compatible with a post-Nietzschean sensibility. So might some versions of 
SRO\WKHLVP , SUHIHU ³QRQWKHLVWLF UHYHUHQFH IRU WKH DPELJXLW\ RI EHLQJ´ &RQQROO\
1993: 385) 
 
Instead of a categorical resistance against every conception of divinity, Connolly inscribes 
himself in a tradition of nontheism. This preference for nontheism is repeated in a number of 
SODFHVLQ&RQQROO\¶VZRUN$JDLQVW.DQW¶VGRJPDWLFNQRZOHGJHRI*RG, simply postulated as 
a necessity for morality, Connolly (2000: 600) identifies a tradition ± LQ.DQW¶V WLPH± that 
µsupported a nontheistic ethic of cultivation¶. The µnontheist Nietzsche¶ &RQQROO\ b: 
882) is the leading figure of this tradition, and Connolly (1999: 16) contends that the 
µQRQWKHLVWLF HQFKDQWPHQW ZLWK WKH ZRUOG SURYLGHV RQH YDOXDEOH VRXUFH RI >«@ a generous 
ethos of engagement in a post-secular society¶ A nontheistic philosophy, in other words, is 
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more compatible with the agonistic conception of democracy that Connolly promotes, as 
opposed to an atheistic position that tends to strive on antagonism (Wenman, 2012). 
 It is this antagonistic and reactionary atheism that Connolly rejects. µThe problem of 
evil within faith, as I will call it, is not confined to Augustinianism and Qutbism. Atheists are 
capable of it, too¶&RQQROO\a: 19)7KHVFHQHLVVHWIRU&RQQROO\¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWVZLWK
(a particular strand of) atheism ± the one that partakes in a faith tradition that identifies the 
problem of the existence of God as one of certainty, as an opposition between Truth and 
Falsehood, Orthodoxy and Heresy. An attempt to build atheism as a certainty against the 
error of God-belief, in other words, is merely an offshoot of an Augustinian understanding of 
faith. Coupled with a reliance on scientific method as the only mode of knowledge, it leads to 
a devastatingly modern claim about the non-existence of God. µThe idea that there is a single 
clear ³logic of atheism´ is itself the product of a modern binary ± belief or unbelief in a 
supernatural being¶ &RQQROO\ a: 17). <HW VXFK FODLPV E\ µscientific¶ atheists are 
defunct, even by internal discussions within the philosophy of VFLHQFH'DZNLQV¶ insistence 
that µevolution is a fact¶ is in fact bad science ± evolution is actually the best falsifiable 
theory that helps to explain a wide range of facts. Similarly, Connolly (2005a: 83) points out 
that µrecent conceptions of science developed by Ilya Prigogine and Stephen Wolfram¶ are far 
closer to philosophical understandings of a pluralistic universe than attempts to find a unified 
scientific method suggest. Against a conception of science as one based on immutable laws, 
and linear causality, Connoll\SURPRWHVDQSKLORVRSK\RIVFLHQFHZKLFKLQFOXGHVµWKHWKHPHV
RI FRPSOH[LW\ GLVWULEXWLYH DJHQF\ FRQQHFWLRQLVP RSHQ V\VWHPV DQG WLPH DV EHFRPLQJ¶
(Connolly, 2011: 37). The antagonism between science and faith that some of the most 
rationalist atheists want to promote can be described as an oversimplification of science. 
Against these conceptions, Connolly argues that µexclusionary variants of Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, and atheism could all profit from going through the Enlightenment¶
12 
 
(2005a:52). In other words, the Enlightenment can and should be saved, because it largely 
relied on a tradition of doubt, including self-GRXEWDERXWRQH¶VEHOLHIV.  
 Connolly is not opposed to all kinds of atheism, which makes a reading of his work as 
an atheology possible. His defence of the atheist is as potent as his attack on dogmatic 
atheism. µ7KH KLVWRULF $PHULFDQ&KULVWLDQ7RFTXHYLOOLDQ FRQVWLWXWLRQ RI ³WKH DWKHLVW´ DV
amoral, selfish, restless, materialistic, and morally unreliable¶ is untenable in his ethos of 
engagement (Connolly, 1999: 158). Using the example of Bertrand Russell, who could not 
get an academic appointment in the United States because of his atheism, Connolly rightfully 
points out that a strict secularist position has the adverse effect of ruling out µthe distinctive 
contributions public atheists might make to public life¶   7KLV SDUDOOHOV 5RUW\¶V
point about the bias against atheists in public life in the United States &RQQROO\¶V SRVW-
secularism, howeverLVDFKDOOHQJHWR5RUW\¶VVWULFWVHFXODULVWSRVLWLRQ7KHµsecular is more 
bound up with generic characteristics of Christian culture than its most enthusiastic 
proponents acknowledge¶ &RQQROO\  , and this may pose particular problems 
against minorities ± atheists, of course, since they are in a minority, but also minority 
religious groups&RQQROO\¶VSRLQWDERXWWKH&KULVWLDQURRWVRIVHFXODULVPFDQEHTXHVWLRQHG
from an atheological position, as it will become clear in the third section.  
 ConQROO\¶VRSSRVLWLRQ WRDWKHLVP LVFOHDUHUKH LV DJDLQVW WKHVHOI-assured, dogmatic 
atheism that rests on claims to truth about the non-existence of God that resemble 
Augustinian conceptions of faith. Against this, Connolly (2005a: 4) proposes to talk about his 
own faith, understood as a creed, a doctrine, an ideology or a philosophy. He labels it a 
nontheistic faith (2005a: 22). &RQQROO\¶V nontheism is thus not incompatible with a particular 
strand of atheism, as it is possible for an atheist to avoid the most dangerous side of 
dogmatism. I have argued elsewhere that a consistently atheistic position is antithetical to 
positing the truth of the inexistence of God. This atheology is a radical sceptical position to 
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begin with, and it doubts divinised concepts, including secularised versions of theological 
conceptions ± Truth, Reason and Science.ii Without abandoning the non-divinised versions of 
these concepts, the atheologist LQVLVWV WKDW WUXWKV DUH DOZD\V SDUWLDO WR RQH¶V SRVLWLRQ WKDW
human reason is neither divine nor perfect, and that science is a human activity with all its 
usual limitations. A consistently atheological position, in other words, is not only sceptical of 
the concept of God, but of the very need for metaphysical unity that is behind such a concept. 
Atheology is thus pluralised, and no longer conceives of its position dogmatically ± as 
proving the non-existence of God ± but as a particular belief in the non-existence of God. The 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ&RQQROO\¶VQRQWKHLVWDQGWKHDWKHLVWLVEOXUUHGHYHQE\&RQQROO\¶VRZQ
standards, when one pluralises atheism.  
$FFHSWLQJ&RQQROO\¶VSUHPLVHWKDWWKHUHLVexistential faith even within atheism, one 
can further blur the dichotomies between nontheism and the atheology I propose here. A less 
unitary conception of atheology accepts that atheism itself is a belief, albeit a belief in the 
non-existence of God. By accepting WKH UDGLFDO VLWXDWHGQHVV RI RQH¶V SRVLWLRQ WKH XOWLPDWH
limitations of human reason, scientific knowledge, and its ability to make claims about the 
ultimate nature of the universe, this atheology positions itself against the dogmatist atheists. 
The Augustinian faith that Connolly attacked remains a potent enemy for an atheology, as it 
is for religious thinkers with radically redefined conceptions of belief or faith, such as Tillich 
(2001). It is thus an informed opinion which recognises its own contingence that the atheist is 
KHUHSXWWLQJIRUZDUGUDWKHUWKDQDFRQYLFWLRQWKDWRQH¶VFODLPLVDQDEVROXWH7UXWKOne can, 
as Connolly does, hang on to a Tillichan conception of faith, or one can, as I do, move the 
debate of an atheology towards the realm of doxa or belief. In this sense it is possible to re-
GHVFULEH &RQQROO\¶V SURMHFW DV DQ DWKHRORJLFDO SURMHFW RQH WKDW FULWLTXHV GRJPDWLF 




 Doing so allows the atheist and the theist to pluralise their own self-understanding, 
and find lines of common agreement against dogmatic understandings of faith. This is what 
Connolly wants to do through agonistic respect (1999: 8, 2005a: 130, Wenman 2008). This is 
one of his cardinal virtues under a pluralist regime. By accepting the contingency and 
SOXULYRFLW\ RI RQH¶V RZQ EHLQJ DWKHLsts and theists can perceive each other as adversaries 
rather than enemies, recognising that they have common adversaries in the most dogmatic 
among their own lines. µAtheists and theists, for instance, can now smile together on occasion 
as each encounters moments of difference within itself from itself¶. Once again, 
agonistic respect can be seen as an attempt to save the Enlightenment demands of toleration 
by taking some of its limitations seriously. Toleration does not entail the abandonment of 
RQH¶V RZQ EHOLHIV EXW PHUHO\ VLWXDWHV LW ZLWKLQ DQ DJRQLVWLF WUDGLWLRQ WKDW UHIRUPXODWHV WKH
demands of the Enlightenment with the demands of a pluralistic ethos. One can save this 
Enlightenment WROHUDWLRQ DV , ZLOO VKRZ LQ WKH IRXUWK VHFWLRQ E\ WDNLQJ &RQQROO\¶V SRLQW 
about its horizontal dimension seriously.  
II Secularism 
There is a tension, as highlighted above, within atheology with regards to secularism. The 
new atheists defend a strict secularism understood as the separation of church and state. 
While Rorty is very close to this view, I will show that his perspective is actually a lot more 
subtle on this issue, and largely informed by his atheology. He points out, indirectly, that 
traditional secularism demands too little from political engagement. Connolly has taken the 
limitations of secularism seriously, and he is famous for having defended his non-secularist 
position ± which shows that traditional secularism demands too much. From this complex 
picture, I will argue that traditional secularism, following the atheologies of Rorty and 
Connolly, demands both too little and too much. It demands too little when it perceives the 
separation of church and state as the ultimate model of government, and it demands too much 
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from the exclusion of our private beliefs from the public sphere. An agonistic secularism on 
the other hand will allow us to reconceptualise secularism ± without abandoning it altogether 
± by redefining its boundaries as part of a political process.  
5RUW\¶V GHIHQFH RI VHFXODULVP VHHPV DW ILUVW VLJKW WR EH UHODWLYHO\ VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG ± 
although it is much more complex than a defence of µtraditional secularism¶, as I will show. 
His defence of liberalism as a cultural preference has earned him from many the label of 
µcommunitarian,¶ and his understanding of liberalism requires a strict separation of religious 
and political power. µFor in its ideal form, the culture of liberalism would be one which was 
enlightened, secular, through and through. It would be one in which no trace of divinity 
remained, either in the form of divinized world or a divinized self¶ 5RUW\  The 
first part of this quotation is straightforwardly secular, and can be understood in terms of a 
strict separation of church and state. Yet the second part of quotation is more ambiguous from 
a secularist position. A secularist does not necessarily aim to de-divinise the world, just to de-
divinise politics. This traditional secularism can be defended from a variety of perspectives ± 
atheistic and theistic ± as one of finding a modus vivendi within which individuals with 
different beliefs can co-H[LVW<HW5RUW\¶VZLVKWRILJKWDGivinised world and divinised self 
goes further than secularism. This quest is more explicitly atheological, and formulated 
within a pluralist and agonistic perspective. The quest of an atheology is not merely to fight a 
particular cKXUFK¶V LQIOXHQFH RYHU politics but to combat all attempts to impose divinised 
concepts on others. For Rorty, these divinised concepts include Nature, the Will, and 
REMHFWLYLVWV¶ EHOLHI WKDW ODQJXDJH UHIOHFWV UHDOLW\ (1989: 24) 5RUW\¶V VHFXODULVP LV KHUH D
challenge to more traditional, non-atheistic defences of secularism. The latter demand too 
OLWWOHIRU5RUW\¶VDJRQLVWLFSUDJPDWLVP6LPSO\VHSDUDWLQJUHOLJLRQDQGSROLWLFVLVQRWHQRXJK
for Rorty, as theological concepts permeate all levels of society ± including the discipline of 
philosophy, with which Rorty had notorious difficulties identifying with. One simply does 
16 
 
QRW OHDYH RQH¶V EHOLHI LQ *RG DW KRPH DQG ZDON LQWR WKH SXEOLF VSKHUH ZLWK GH-divinised 
FRQFHSWV2QH¶VEHOLHILQ*RG± RURQH¶VEHOLHILQWKHQRQ-existence of God ± informs RQH¶V
other beliefs, the separation between what lies inside and outside the public sphere is too 
simplistic indeed.  
 Connolly has taken this challenge towards secularism seriously. This is because, for 
Connolly, existential faith ± ZKDW , ZRXOG FDOO WKH EHOLHIV WKDW QHFHVVDULO\ XQGHUOLH RQH¶V
actions ± are not clearly distinguishable between secular and religious beliefs. As he clarifies, 
µI do not make the sharp distinction between religious faith and secular reason¶ &RQQROO\
2005a: 27), on the basis that secularism itself is not merely a lack of belief, but a belief at 
least in its existential dimension. Secularism makes a normative claim about what should be 
separated ± public reason and private faith ± which is unsustainable for Connolly. In addition 
to this separation between reason and faith, µwestern secularism emerging from the 
Enlightenment is today too unalert to the role that enactment, discipline, and ritual play in its 
own mode of being¶ a: 52). Although secularism pretends to neutrality, it clearly 
imposes certain disciplinary restrictions upon individuals that are not themselves neutral, but 
take sides in favour of a particular conception of agency and faith that is itself deeply 
engrained in Christian roots. This clashes both with atheists for whom the very concept of 
salvation is problematic, and minority cultures in the West who do not share this conception 
of religion as individual faith. The latter is already problematized in political theory, while 
the former is not. What does an atheology à la Connolly, in other words, tell us about limits 
of these Christian roots of secularism? For him, secularism demands too much of the 
separation of private and public spheres. The secularist position adopted by Rawls, for 
example, is criticised by Connolly because its attempt to de-essentialise faith is unconvincing. 
As Connolly puts it, there are three componenWV WR 5DZOV¶ VHFXODULVP  WR UHIXVH WKH
authoritative centre of traditional secularist theory; 2) µto disconnect belief (but not its 
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symbolic expression) from devout enactments and ritual performances;¶ and 3) to reach a 
consensus on public justice (Connolly, 2005a: 50). Only the first of these is acceptable for 
Connolly. The others demand too much of the individual ± that they enter public debate by 
re-phrasing their convictions in rational terms to be understood by all ± and µrests upon a 
superficial reading of the complex relation between devotional mood, performance, and 
belief¶ a: 60). Connolly is correct in his assessment, although I would push his 
argument further by an appeal to hermeneutics RQH¶V GHHSHVW EHOLHIV PHWDSK\VLFDO RU
philosophical) always already LQIRUP RQH¶V SROLWLFDO EHOLHIV 7R LQVLVW RQ WKH VHSDUDWLRQ RI
public reason and private faith is to fool oneself into thinking that simply re-phrasing the 
WHUPVRIRQH¶VEHOLHIVZLOOHnable a social compromise (on the meaning of justice, for Rawls). 
In addition, it may be the case that the secularised public realm obfuscates the dominance of 
the majority culture. Atheists, among other minorities, have good reasons to be careful about 
such hidden prejudices. The translation of religious holy days into public holidays, the 
framing of debates on public health (abortion and euthanasia) as one of a defence of life, and 
the interdiction of religious symbols in schools (where Christianity does not necessitate a 
particular orthopraxy as part of religious observance) are all symptoms of such cultural 
dominance. Notwithstanding whether the value of neutrality is worth saving in the first place 
(Newey, 1997), sHFXODULVP¶VFODLPWRQHXWUDOLW\JURZVWhinner indeed. 
 Both Rorty and Connolly provide alternatives to traditional secularism, albeit from 
different angles. The former tells us that secularism demands too little, while the latter tells us 
that secularism demands too much. My argument here is that they are both correct in their 
DVVHVVPHQWV)URPDSROLWLFDODWKHRORJ\¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVHFXODULVPGHPDQGVWRROLWWOHLILWGRHV
not allow the potent critique of atheism towards divinised beliefs and concepts permeating 




state, a particular kind of secularism can still be defended. It needs to be re-conceptualised as 
an agonistic secularism, where limitations imposed on public life are part of the debate, and 
not decided a priori through cultural (and hence often religiously-dominant) preference. As 
long as a single perspective is not imposed upon all, and as long as no significant minority 
feels threatened by the secular compromise, the limits of the secular order should be up for 
political bargaining. What might this agonistic secularism look like? It may still impose limits 
both on religious influence over public life, and state control of religious life.   
 
III Toleration 
5RUW\¶V GHIHQce of liberal democracy rests upon his preference for pragmatic and tolerant 
worldviews, where the individual is left enough space to self-create. As Berstein (1987) has 
QRWHGKRZHYHU5RUW\¶VYLHZRIWROHUDWLRQFDQEHSUREOHPDWLFLQWKDWLWVHHPVWREHGHILQHG
E\ LQGLIIHUHQFHZKLOH VRPHRI5RUW\¶VPRVW µcommunitarian¶ statements are impervious to 
the intolerant tactics of exclusion behind appealing to a µwe¶. Rorty¶Vdefence of toleration 
rests on a relatively strict interpretation of secularism. If secularism is about separating 
church and state, then toleration is about separating moral judgments from interfering with 
individual choices. In a plural society where one moral code will not be agreed upon, 
µindifference¶, DV%HUQVWHLQODEHOV5RUW\¶VWROHUDWLRQ is the least-worst scenario. It is not the 
opposition to difference ± it presupposes it ± or to caring ± it still allows for caring social 
relations ± but it is the minimal demand of public life. It is defended as a position against 
those who seek to impose a unitary way of life on others. $UH5RUW\¶VPRVWFRPPXQLWDULDQ
moments to be understood as a drive towards this kind of unity? Bernstein insists that when 
Rorty uses the term µwe¶, he may be guilty of the worst kind of intolerant tactic. µWe¶ 
pragmatists, liberals and atheists, as Rorty would say, could exclude a whole range of others: 
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µthey¶ Kantians, communists and theists. Yet that would be to push toleration too far. 
7ROHUDWLRQ GRHV QRW GHPDQG WKH DEDQGRQPHQW RI RQH¶V EHOLHIV QRU GRHV LW VXSSRVH D
KDUPRQLRXV V\VWHP RI WROHUDWLRQ 7ROHUDWLRQ LV LWVHOI D FRPSURPLVH EHWZHHQ RQH¶V GHHSHVW
EHOLHIVDVDSUDJPDWLVW OLEHUDODQGDWKHLVWIRU5RUW\DQGRWKHUV¶Gifferent beliefs that one 
does not share, but which one accepts as legitimate ways to live a fulfilling life. Bernstein is 
FRUUHFW WR DUJXH WKDW 5RUW\¶V WROHUDWLRQ LV ERWK LQGLIIHUHQW DQG EDVHG XSRQ VWURQJ EHOLHIV ± 
neither of which is contrary to a deep-seated defence of toleration.  
 &RQQROO\¶VSRVLWLRQ is similar. Toleration is a consequence of pluralism, but pluralism 
does not entail the µabandonment of all standards¶&RQQROO\a: 42), on the contrary it 
demands the agonistic defence RI RQH¶V VWDQGDUGV DJDLQVW WKH HQFURDFKPHQW RI XQLWDULDQ
drives. A pluralist is not a cultural relativist ± that would entail saying that the majority 
culture is always right, a problem for a minority viewpoint such as a political atheology ± but 
a pluralist prizes diversity as a value ± as a sign of resistance against those who wish to unite 
all under one banner, crushing diversity in the process. Hence toleration is defendable as a 
minimal standard ± EXWWKLVLVQRW&RQQROO\¶VSUHIHUUHGSRVLWLRQ&RQQROOy instead advocates 
for agonistic respect ± as opposed to the more traditional view of toleration coming from the 
centre and being bestowed upon minorities. Agonistic respect is the first virtue of the pluralist 
for Connolly. µAgonistic respect is a kissing cousin of liberal tolerance. But liberal tolerance 
is bestowed upon private minorities by a putative majority occupying the authoritative, public 
center¶ a: 123). The agonistic dimension of this virtue allows Connolly to defend a 
horizontal and competitive type of respect ± as opposed to a vertical and deferential mode of 
toleration found in liberalism.  
 As Sune Lægaard (2007) and Christian Rostbøll (2009) noted about the Danish 
cartoon controversy, there is a tension between traditional toleration in liberalism, based on 
DXWRQRP\ DQG UHVSHFW IRU GLYHUVLW\ 'UDZLQJ RQ 6WHSKHQ 'DUZDOO¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
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recognition respect and appraisal respect (1977), Rostbøll argues that the Kantian conception 
of autonomy is compatible with recognition respect ± recognising the other as a person 
capable of making autonomous decisions ± while not necessitating appraisal respect ± the 
SRVLWLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIVRPHRQH¶VFKDUDFWHU7KLVW\SHRIUHVSHFWLQRWKHUZRUGVDOORZVXVWR
maintain µthe permissibility of criticism of religious dogma¶ Rostbøll, 2009: 637) so 
HVVHQWLDO WRDWKHRORJ\5RVWE¡OO¶Vdefence of recognition respect DQG&RQQROO\¶Vdefence of 
agonistic respect are in fact compatible with the pluralistic toleration highlighted above.  
Respect, as it is qualified by Rostbøll and Connolly, is increasingly looking like 
something very demanding of individuals. The primary issue here is that respect may demand 
too much from others, and not enough of oneself. It may demand that others refrain from 
FULWLTXHZKLOHWDNLQJRQH¶VEHOLHIVIRUVDFUHGDQGLQQHHGRISURWHFWLRQE\ODZ,QDSOXUDOLVW
world, however, neither of those demands can be sustained. Against demands for respect, 
toleration seems a good-enough guarantee, if it can be conceptualised in a manner that avoids 
the top-down, majority-minority toleration that Connolly is rightfully critical of. One could 
ORRN DW WKH HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\ DWKHLVW WKH EDURQ G¶+ROEDFK IRU LQVSLUDWLRQ KHUH +LV HDUO\
works were derogatory, highly polemical, and often injurious to dominant beliefs. Yet in his 
late works he puts forward a radical defence of toleration (Israel, 2010). Holbach the staunch 
atheist argued that persecution of others on the grounds of their religious beliefs was the 
worst kind of tyranny (2001: 491). Against those who argue that eighteenth-century 
philosophes were intolerant of religious belief, one of their most radical members extended 
calls for toleration he had found in Locke to include those still excluded from the English 
philoVRSKHU¶V WROHUDWLRQ ± Catholics and atheists. Unlike Locke whose toleration is only 
internal to protestant beliefs, Holbach is also externally tolerant of other religious beliefs, and 
is a better model for toleration (Spinner-Halev, 2005). Holbach still used irony and reasoned 
argumentation against other beliefs, but simultaneously defended a model of horizontal 
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toleration. Disrespect can be a tool of toleration ± in particular when it comes to challenging 
majoritarian and unitarian drives that seek to weaken pluralism.  
 ,Q RUGHU WR DGGUHVV &RQQROO\¶V SRLQW DERXW WKH WRS-down nature of traditional 
toleration, however, we still need to see what type of virtue toleration is. Galeotti (1993) has 
distinguished between toleration as a social virtue, and toleration as a political virtue. 
According to her, only toleration as a political virtue is required, as a means to guarantee 
equal respect and dignity. This distinction is powerful in that it limits the role of toleration to 
the political sphere, and has consequences for the social sphere. If toleration is the bare 
minimum of political virtue ± WRDFFHSWDQRWKHU¶VGLIIHUHQFHDVOHJLWLPDWH± and also acts as a 
limit on FHUWDLQJURXSV¶demands for respect ± as their difference does not shield them from 
critique ± it also allows for a stronger virtue to surface at the social level. This social virtue is 
found in WKH HWKRV RI HQJDJHPHQW RI &RQQROO\ RU +ROEDFK¶V VRFLDELOLW\ :KLOH DWKHRORJ\
demands a particular version of toleration, which might be morH OLPLWHG WKDQ &RQQROO\¶V
agonistic respect suggests, it allows for a more generous engagement with other traditions at 
the social ± or academic ± level. In the words of Connolly (1999: 159): 
What contributions to a public ethos of engagement might public atheists make in 
such a situation? Well, a political movement that translates the assigned marks of 
atheism into cultivation of nontheistic gratitude for the ambiguity of being opens up 
some possibilities. 
 
 &RQQROO\¶V LQVLVWHQFH WKDW all humans have a kind of existential faith (2005a: 25-6) 
poses a final challenge to a conception of toleration in atheology. Even if re-phrased in terms 
of existential belief, the precise existential element further breaks the dichotomy between 
private belief and public reason that Rorty wished to hang on to. Atheology, with its 
emphasis on a critique of faith and its reformulation in terms of belief, can be impervious to 
the problem of practice within religion. Jeff Spinner-Halev (2005) points out a similar 
challenge faced by Hinduism, as a practiced-based rather than faith-based religion. Andrew 
Sabl (2009:526) has argued that a Humean conception of toleration, taken as a political virtue 
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based on prudence, justifies the protection of minority practices as a first step towards wider 
toleration ± including toleration of non-religious beliefs. An Enlightenment conception of 
toleration can be saved if it incorporates the need to tolerate practices from minority religious 
groups. Going further than Rorty, one can argue that the insensitivity of traditional toleration 
theories to religious practices of (non-Western) religions is itself a divinised concept. Its roots 
can be traced back in a Christian (Pauline) separation of practice from belief to facilitate the 
conversion of Gentiles reluctant to observe Judaic law. A Rortyan project of de-divinisation 
thus necessitates the re-thinking of toleration of religious practices. In addition to a critique of 
orthodoxy already seen in atheology, a critique of orthopraxy (the imposition of particular 
practices) becomes a necessity. An illustration of post-Christian understanding of toleration, 
through a short excursion into the role of religion and religious practices into education will 
help illuminate the consequences of this atheological conception of secularism and toleration.  
 
IV The French ban on the veil: a hard case for a political atheology 
It has been a traditional concern of atheists and secularists to delimit the role that religious 
movements play in the education system. This is certainly true of Richard Dawkins (2006: 
286), for whom both fundamentalist and moderate religion are complicit in attacking 
scientific education of young children. It is also one of the central concerns behind the veil 
controversy in France ± keeping out religious symbols from public institutions, such as state-
funded schools (Galeotti, 1993) ± and forms part of the programme of the National Atheist 
Party in the United States. The role of religion in education is pivotal to debates about 
secularism, as the strict separation of church and state-funded education clashes with 
VWXGHQWV¶ RU WKHLU SDUHQWV¶ SUDFWLFHV An atheology with the above-mentioned inclinations 
towards agonistic secularism and toleration poses three further issues than those traditionally 
attached to the issue of the French ban on the veil in political theory: the issue of minority 
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beliefs, discrimination in favour of atheists, and restrictions on freedom of expression as the 
suppression of critique.  
 The political theory literature on the French ban on wearing of veils in public schools 
is wide and detailed. Here, I am only concerned with how a political atheology, as described 
above against the background of my critiques of Rorty and Connolly, would consider this 
hard case in novel ways. Atheism, even with its plurality, is still a minority belief. As such, it 
should have particular affinities with other minority beliefs against drives towards uniformity 
by majority beliefs. Commentators have noted that the ban says more about cultural 
prejudices towards µMaghrebi-Muslim cultural identity¶ .|NHU and the unitary 
notion of French national identity than it says about legitimate limits imposed by secularism. 
Atheists have good reasons to fear that such conceptions of national identity could promote 
France as a Christian country, or indeed Europe as a Christian landmass, as the then French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy was not shy of claiming. The ethos of engagement promoted here, 
whereby differences are put in the larger context of majoritarian drives, poses a first 
atheological challenge towards banning minority practices. Patrick Weil (2009) has provided 
one of the best liberal defences of the ban on wearing the veil in public schools. Yet he 
largely exemplifies this majoritarian drive towards minority practices. Weil argued that the 
rising threat of violence against young women not wearing the veil in some public schools 
QHFHVVLWDWHGQHZOHJLVODWLRQ:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWLV LQHVVHQFHSDWHUQDOLVWLFDVKHFRQFHLYHVRI
young women and their parents as being unable to resist community pressures towards 
wearing the veil (justifying new blanket legislation). It is also unitarian, in that it conceives 
that the only solution to communitarian pressures is a law that essentially drives minorities 
into conformity with the practices of the majority. If all French young women did not wear 
the veil, the issue of violence would disappear. Conversion to the majority culture, contra 
toleration of minority practices, is defended as the only option.  
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 This raises an issue of discrimination against minority practices that is 
institutionalised by the ban on the veil. A compulsory wearing of the veil for all young 
women in French schools would also have prevented the issue of violence. Of course, this is 
inconceivable in the French context. But the issue of discrimination remains, particularly by 
tKHODZ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRµRVWHQWDWLRXV¶UHOLJLRXVVLJQV7KHVHDGPLWWHGO\LQFOXGHYHLOVNLSSDKV
and large crosses, but exclude small crosses (commonly worn in France) and potentially 
exclude smalls signs of adherence to atheistic beliefs ± such a Darwin fish pin ± but not 
ostentatious signs of atheism ± such as a spaghetti monster T-shirt. Of course these external 
signs of adherence to a particular belief have difference significations, ranging from the 
trivial to the meaningful, from the aesthetic to the existential. While an atheist might react 
light-heartedly to a ban on wearing a particular T-shirt, she should still be weary of 
discriminative practices, even those in her favour. It is possible to conceive of a ban on 
something that most atheists hold dear ± such as a ban on criticising religion where it is 
perceived as harmful ± because it SXWVWKHDWKHLVWV¶EHOLHIVDERXWUHOLJLRQRVWHQWDWLRXVO\LQWKH
open. Any ban on a practice of a minority belief, whether it is wearing a veil or debating the 
harm done by a religion institution, should be resisted on the grounds that one cannot always 
SULYDWLVHRQH¶VEHOLHIV to the extent that they become invisible to the majority culture. The 
current ban on veils in French public schools, in other words, may positively discriminate 
against atheists, but precisely because it does, one should resist it as an unfair practice that 
sets an unacceptable precedent.  
 Hence it is precisely because the ban restricts freedom of expression of belief that it is 
viewed as dangerous by a political atheology. Agonistic toleration implies that one can base 
DUJXPHQWVRQRQH¶VEHOLHIV$Q\UHVWULFWLRQRQH[SUHVVLQJRQH¶VEHOLHIVLVDWWKHYHU\OHDVWWR
be outweighed against the benefits for all those affected, not simply those who fit the 
majority culture. If the French ban is justified, as Weil does, by an appeal to keeping religious 
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faith as a private matter, it endangers the ability of atheists to defend their beliefs if those are 
included under the category of religious beliefs. In particular, it may endanger the ability of 
atheists critically engage with religious beliefs, and potentially offend their sensibilities as 
part of their own freedom of expression. A consistent defence of freedom of expression 
cannot avoid looking beyond expression in terms of speech, and looking at practices as part 
of a much larger social issue that would deserve more time than I can give it here. :HLO¶V
argument that the ban does not affect the public sphere, but merely schools, is unconvincing 
as a subsequent law further restricted the wearing of full head veils in public. Whilst more 
limited in its application (it only covers niqabs or burkas, not veils per se), the law effectively 
prohibits certain signs of religious adherence in the public sphere. The paternalism 
highlighted above against minors (and their parents) is extended to some adult women. While 
the ban may be consistent with &RQQROO\¶V DJRQLVWLF UHVSHFW (particularly if critique is 
perceived as disrespectful of majority practices), it is incompatible with the model of 
toleration I have put forward. Toleration implies that one needs to accept practices one 
potentially disagrees with ± such as the wearing of veil ± because they are meaningful for 
others who do not share our beliefs. The alternative is demanding respect for a (majority) 
culture at the cost of tolerating minorities. Enforcing respect for the French model of laïcité 
ignores both the complex articulation of this model since 1905, and its goal to keep the 
majoritarian belief from trampling on minority beliefs. Secularism can be conceptualised as 
an agonistic struggle between different beliefs ± not one skewed towards a majoritarian 
practice ± and toleration needs to be defended against the threat of majoritarian demands for 





In conclusion, atheism cannot be left to the new atheists, but can learn something from them. 
A political atheology, one defined by pluralism, a critical scepticism and an ethic of 
engagement can both keep the critical edge of negative atheism and build a positive side of 
dialogue and inter-subjective conception of agency. While a monistic atheism is possible, and 
often advocated for, under universal principles of reason, scientific method and strict 
secularism, it is by no means the only ± or the most developed ± atheism of the past decades. 
Rorty and Connolly, in different ways, have contributed positive atheologies that challenge 
WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ RI DWKHLVP 7KRXJK WKH\ GLIIHU LQ LPSRUWDQW UHVSHFWV 5RUW\¶V GHIHQFH RI D
VWULFW VHFXODULVP DQG WKH YLUWXH RI WROHUDWLRQ DQG &RQQROO\¶V SRVW-secularism and agonistic 
respect both point towards an atheoORJ\WKDW LQVFULEHVLWVHOI LQDVWUXJJOHIRUFLWL]HQV¶VRXOV
where other belief-systems have an equal legitimate right to compete. There are important 
challenges ahead for such a political atheology. It must hang on to pluralism against drives, 
within atheistic circles, towards unitarianism. It must both strengthen its sense of secularism 
and toleration, and not lose sight of its own critical edge. It must defend other minorities that 
face challenges from a dominant (Christian) culture, including widening its critique of this 
culture to include toleration of religious practices as well as beliefs. Through a particular 
ethos of engagement, it must find areas of commonality with religious faiths, where alliances 
are possible and desirable.  
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i
 0HLOODVVRX[¶VWKRXJKWLVPRUHVXEWOHWKDW,DOORZIRUKHUH+LVVSHFXODWLYHUHDOLVPLVQRWLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKH
coming of a god ± conceived as a non-necessary being (Watkin, 2011: 132-67; Harmann, 2013).  
ii
 One could distinguish here between atheism as radical sceptical position from a pure sceptical position better 
ODEHOOHGDVDJQRVWLFLVP,VKDUH&RQQROO\¶VYLHZWKDWSXUHVFHSWLFLVPLVQRWSRVVLEOHVLQFHWKHUHDUHH[LVWHQWLDO
elements to all belief-systems. Agnosticism is perhaps even more pure than atheism, but it is not clear that it 
would speak to political theorists.  
